普罗米修斯
三星又陷“电池门” 不过这次大概不会炸了_我的网站
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In economics, overcapacity is a dynamic and relative concept. Supply-demand balance is temporary, and imbalance is the norm. The Western narrative that equates the sheer scale of China's production capacity directly with "overcapacity" is, frankly, economically illiterate. It conflates size with pathology.
Consider the math. China's manufacturing sector accounts for roughly 30 percent of global manufacturing value-added - a dominance unmatched since the post-war US. Yet this reflects not overcapacity but competitive capacity. The critics ignore that China's trade surplus in 2025 reached a record $1.2 trillion, roughly equivalent to the GDP of a top-20 economy like Saudi Arabia. They ignore that Chinese exports carry high import content - foreign value-added accounts for nearly half of gross export value - meaning China's capacity integrates global supply chains rather than displacing them.
The judgment lacks rigor because it applies a static snapshot to a dynamic system. It assumes that if China produces more than it currently consumes domestically, the surplus is automatically "overcapacity." Nonsense. By that logic, Germany's persistent trade surplus in automobiles and machinery would constitute chronic overcapacity. It does not, because German capacity serves global demand. So does China's. The narrative isn't economics. It's politics dressed in economic jargon.
Western critics attribute the price advantages of Chinese green technology products to "government subsidies" and "market distortion." This is a convenient story. It is also wrong. The global competitiveness of China's green technology industries stems from four interconnected factors: massive domestic market scale, decades of sustained infrastructure investment, a highly educated STEM workforce, and fierce intra-industry competition. China's NEV purchase-tax exemptions, extended through 2027, total approximately 520 billion yuan ($77.05 billion). Substantial? Yes. But causally linked to overcapacity? No.
The causal chain critics imagine - subsidies → artificial competitiveness → overproduction - collapses under scrutiny. The EU's IPCEI battery programs allocated over 6 billion euros, plus EIB financing. The US CHIPS Act appropriated $54.2 billion for semiconductors, while the Inflation Reduction Act funnels hundreds of billions into clean energy. All major economies subsidize strategic industries. The difference is that China converted subsidies into systemic efficiency: its nominal lithium-ion cell capacity reached approximately 2.2 TWh by end-2023, driving global average battery pack prices down 20 percent year-on-year to $115 per kilowatt-hour in 2024. That is not distortion. That's innovation at scale.
Chinese firms filed 20,081 European patent applications in 2024 - 10.1 percent of the total, with battery technology patents surging 79 percent year-on-year. Patents reflect innovation, not subsidy dependency. The causal link between subsidies and overcapacity is weak; the link between scale, innovation, and competitiveness is robust.
Meanwhile, global demand for green and low-carbon transition is experiencing explosive growth. The International Energy Agency projects that renewable capacity additions must triple by 2030 to meet Paris Agreement targets. In this context, labeling China's wind, photovoltaic, and battery capacity as "overcapacity" is not merely wrong - it is dangerously counterproductive.
In fact, China's capacity has played an indispensable role in advancing the global energy transition. Chinese solar module production costs have fallen roughly 90 percent over the past decade. Goldman Sachs Research notes that China manufactured approximately 86 percent of global solar modules, 80 percent of lithium-ion batteries, and 68 percent of electric vehicles in 2024. This is not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets; it is capacity the world desperately needs.
The "overcapacity" label assumes a zero-sum game where Chinese production crowds out others. The reality is synergistic: Chinese capacity lowers global clean energy costs, enabling faster deployment worldwide. The "overcapacity" label holds only if one believes the world should slow decarbonization to protect less competitive producers and to empower those that deliberately employ "burn, baby, burn" tactics. That's industrial protectionism intersecting with brown imperialism, and it's disproportionately impacting the Global South, which is more vulnerable to climate breakdown, precisely when it's finally trying to shake off centuries of systemic Western exploitation and suppression.
Furthermore, the disparity in how the West treats its own industrial policy versus China's is glaring. When the US funnels $52.7 billion through the CHIPS Act for semiconductors, or when the EU subsidizes Airbus, or when American agricultural subsidies distort global food markets, the silence from Western media is deafening. When China gains an edge in manufacturing, it faces media offensives and policy restrictions.
This is not inconsistency. This is strategy. The underlying motivation is the "China threat" rubric - a framework that treats China's development itself as a danger to the Western-led order. Countries wagging their fingers at China do so not because China violates economic rules they themselves follow, but because China succeeds under rules they once wrote to their own advantage.
These accusers possess their own national industrial policies and subsidies. They have long exploited historical and contemporary advantages against China and developing countries. They have not competed well, have not provided themselves with good governance, and have not invested adequately in their own infrastructure, education, and R&D. They have allowed their own leading industries to seek monopolistic positions detrimental not only to others but to their own consumers. Rather than reform themselves, they blame China.
In these contexts, the cry of "China Shock 2.0" is the latest iteration of an old playbook: frame China's development as a threat to global stability rather than a contribution to global progress. The claim that China's advances in renewable energy and AI will send more serious shock waves than traditional manufacturing displacement is analytically flawed and politically motivated.
First, the premise is false. China is not reducing the market share of developed countries through unfair means; it is outcompeting them through innovation, scale, and efficiency. According to Goldman Sachs Research, China's "new three" green technology sectors alone contributed around one percentage point to the country's 5.4 percent nominal export growth in 2025. This is competitive capacity serving global demand, not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets.
Second, the "shock" framing ignores history. China maintained production and trade flows in 2020 while major Western economies crashed, providing essential goods to global markets, likely saving millions of lives while mitigating what would have been greater global economic harm. The "shock" is not to the global economy; it is to Western complacency.
Third, the argument is self-contradictory. The critics want China to be simultaneously weak enough to dismiss and strong enough to fear. If China's high-tech development is genuinely formidable - so innovative and efficient that it threatens to displace developed economies - then it is delivering precisely the technological progress the world needs to meet climate goals. Restricting it through tariffs and barriers would harm global innovation, raise energy costs for developing countries, and slow decarbonization. The critics would be sacrificing the planet to protect their own complacency.
"China Shock 2.0" is a rhetorical device to justify protectionism. It replaces engagement with containment, competition with confrontation. The world does not need another shock doctrine. It needs cooperation, investment, and the recognition that China's rise is not a threat but an opportunity - for green transition, for technological progress, for shared prosperity, and for a shared future.
The author is a professor of politics and international relations and director of the Center for Ecological Civilization at East China Normal University in Shanghai. [email protected]
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在与其他人交流后，他发现其他数码 UP 主也注意到了类似的情况。出现问题的手机覆盖范围很广，从古早的三星 Galaxy S4 ，一直到相当近的 Galaxy S20 FE 甚至是Z Fold 2 ，都有出现问题。他说，自己在公开曝光这件事之前，已经等了 50 天，然而三星一直没有给出回复。
一直到视频发出半个月后，三星终于给出了啥也没给的回复：得知这件事的托尼立刻进行了一次身边统计学，结果出人意料，又在情理之中：情理之中的是，整个编辑部能找到的三星手机加起来少于 5 部。你说这图和三星无关？无关就对了……▼
而意料之外的是，在抽屉里长期储存的那些三星手机，都没有出现那位 UP 主描述中的鼓包现象。
B | 不过上微博转了一圈，托尼发现在事件发酵前， 就已经有不少中国用户反映三星的电池容易鼓包了：
由于这次“ 电池门 ”涉及到的型号和生产时间跨度太大，托尼认为这事不太像是品控或电池厂商问题，更有可能是三星的某种系统性失误。而这个失误， 最先让人想到的就是三星的电池选型。在 Note7 成为哑火手雷之后，三星痛定思痛，决定改用不太可能起火的凝胶电池。在此之前，市场上只有索尼采用这种电池。
C | 大多数手机电池用的是 液态电解质的 锂离子电池，也就是说，电池内部有很多流动性不错的有机液体。这种有机溶液一旦碰到高温（ 比如电池短路 ）或水蒸气就会分解，产生大量气体。
D | 一旦电池包装被气体吹爆或是被外部刺穿，电解液就会流出电池，与空气大面积接触，造成起火。
E | 而凝胶电池的电解质类似于果冻，即使包装破裂，也不会有电解液流出，大大降低了起火几率。与一般锂离子电池相比，凝胶电池更安全，而且充放电时对电极的损耗更小，容量衰减慢。
F | 但凝胶电池生产工艺复杂，价格高；能量密度低，而且电池内阻大。这就导致凝胶电池既贵，容量又小，充电还慢，属于是完美地反向切中手机的续航痛点。因此，没有产品大“ 爆 ”过的手机厂商，一般不会选择凝胶电池。三星延续至今的 25W “ 快 ”充估计就有电池的因素 ▼
当然，凝胶电池作为一种三星特色，最容易让人怀疑与这次三星独占的“ 电池门 ”有关，但也不是三星电池鼓包的唯一可能原因。毕竟这次爆出的鼓包手机并不全都使用了凝胶电池，比如较早发布的三星 Galaxy S4 和 S7 就是一般的锂离子电池。
因此托尼同样怀疑，三星在电池管理方面有缺陷。这可能导致三星手机在长期关机的情况下，电池快速进入过放状态。现代手机关机后，主板上的某些元件可能仍然在工作。比如大多数手机都支持的关机闹钟和定时关机，就需要记录时间的芯片不断电。
但如果三星的电池管理方案，不会在电池电量低的情况下完全切断主板电源，就会造成过度放电。过放会对电池造成相当严重的损伤。
G | 其中一个表现就是电解质在电极上分解，产生大量气体，进而导致鼓包。
当然，相比过度充电或电池内部短路造成的损伤，过放不太可能造成燃烧和爆炸，因为过放状态的电池，能量已经基本耗尽了。但无论是什么原因，鼓包的电池都不该重新充电，它的内部结构可能已经损坏，充电时说不定就会给你来一下狠的。这次三星电池门，从 Mrwhosetheboss 首次报告到现在已经过去两个半个月了，但三星依然没有给出一个有用的答复。虽说电池鼓包并不罕见，但让一群数码大 V 不得不公开质疑产品来为自己要个结果，三星这次无论是产品还是公关，都有不小的问题。还好这次电池不会突然烧起来，不然三星又要挨上一棒了。
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Published on:05:06:45
